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Introduction 
 
My master thesis is a continuation of work started in my project thesis. The project thesis 
was converted into an academic article and submitted to the European Safety and Reliability 
Conference (ESREL). It will be presented at ESREL September 2010 in Greece.  Due to 
positive response to the project theses and possible future publication, the master thesis has 
been written as an academic article according to the IMRAD principle. The main content in 
this master thesis is therefore written in a two-column forma accordingly to the standards of 
academic articles published by Elsevier.  
Input for this study has mainly been gained through interviews, literature study of regulations 
and by. The raw material and key points from the interviews considered most important are 
enclosed in electronic on a compact disc. The CD is not subject to the basis of evaluation, 
but may however be useful in further work.  
All opinions expressed in this reports are solely those of the author and does not represent 
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, its academic staff or collaborative 
partners. Representation of the interviews is attempted to be presented as honest and 
objective as possible.    
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Abstract 
This paper examines the accident reporting procedures in the maritime transportation sector. 
A parallel study, corresponding to this study, revealed a vast amount of underreporting by 
several western flag states. This is resulting in a poor situational awareness, making it 
difficult to implement sufficient measures and derive a wanted safety level. Reporting of 
accidents is globally regulated by IMO and made mandatory by the flag states‟ regulations. 
The Norwegian flag state, regulating the procedures for all Norwegian flagged vessels and 
for all vessels in Norwegian waters has been the main focus in this paper.   
Reporting of an accident can be visualized as a chain of actors which information has to pass 
through. Underreporting occurs if the links between the actors are broken.  The chain starts 
in one end with the ship‟s crew and master, being the first to detect any accident. The 
information is then passed on to the ship owner, who in turn forwards a report to the 
respective flag state. Alternatively, an accident can be detected by Vessel Traffic Services or 
by Rescue Coordination Centers. 
Input for this study was gained through interviewing the actors in the reporting chain and 
through a literature study of the legislation regulating the procedures. Further, a comparative 
threshold analysis was carried out to measure the differences in the threshold for reporting 
an incident for the aviation industry in comparison with the maritime industry. 
The results indicated that the links in the reporting chain is vulnerable to breaches. The 
Norwegian legislation seems to be somewhat ineffective with respect to actors placed under 
a mandatory reporting scheme. The Norwegian legislation is not efficient enough to protect 
the findings from investigation to be used in other contexts than what it is intended for, 
meaning that investigation reports are misused as evidences in court. The ship owners 
appear to be little motivated because they receive little relevant feedback. The seafarers also 
seem to be withholding reports to their ship owners due to their fear of being punished or 
fired. Compared to the aviation industry, the maritime transportation sector is characterized 
by a poor safety culture, meaning that the sector shows little interest in sharing and receiving 
lessons learned by experience.  
Much can be transferred from the aviation industry or from other flag states, like the United 
Kingdom. Reporting performance may be increased by improving regulations, motivation and 
safety culture.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
When calculating risk one must consider 
the probability of an accident to occur and 
its expected consequence. An 
approximation of accident probability may 
be calculated by use of for example 
Bayesian Networks or by simulation as 
demonstrated by Friis-Hansen et al. 
(2006). Calculation and/or expert judgment 
will however be restricted to the accuracy 
of estimated inputs from the real world or 
bound by constrains for a confined 
scenario. On the other side, the severities 
of consequences are often estimated 
through event tree analysis (ETA) or 
through failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA). A trustworthy reflection of status 
quo within the maritime sector is thus best 
ensured by proper reporting of accidents 
and incidents to searchable databases.  
A recognized format of a maritime risk 
model is the Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA). The FSA was developed by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
with the sole purpose to support the 
development of new rules and regulations. 
The assessment is supposed to be a 
proactive tool, which means auditing rules 
and regulations as well as design and 
construct safety barriers before accidents 
occur. The FSA is carried out in five steps 
each involving different methods and 
function as an input for the next: (1) 
identification of hazards, (2) risk analysis, 
(3) establishing risk control options, (4) 
cost-benefit assessment and finally (5) 
recommendations for decision making 
(IMO, 2002).  
Though being invented by IMO, the FSA 
methodology seems to be recognized by 
other key players like classifications 
societies. Classification societies‟ intention 
for using the FSA are developing 
classification rules and to carry out safety 
assessments for individual vessels 
(Kristiansen, 2008). In order to follow the 
development of vessel accidents and 
severe incidents the whole process needs 
to be frequently reviewed and adequate 
actions re-considered. Situational 
awareness is provided through constantly 
monitoring accidents and through 
collecting reports. This will in turn allow 
proactive measures to be carried out.  
A recent study of underreporting of 
vessels accidents (Hassel, 2010) revealed 
a vast amount of missing vessel accidents 
in the databases of the flag states Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, 
United States, Canada, Greece and the 
Netherlands for the period January 1st 
2005 – January 1st 2010. The study also 
includes the database IHS Fairplay Sea-
Web™. Different methods were utilized in 
order to calculate the amount of 
underreported accidents in the respective 
databases. First, a best case scenario, 
representing the absolute lower limit of 
underreporting was estimated by 
comparing common accident entries in the 
Sea-Web™ database with each of the flag 
state databases. Another method was also 
used, by applying formulas on conditional 
probabilities making it possible to calculate 
the limit of underreporting by comparing 
flag state databases against Sea-Web™ 
and counting their common entries. The 
third method used in quantifying 
underreporting is a capture-recapture 
method, called Chao‟s lower bound 
estimate. Finally a sub-set of insurance 
claim data from the Nordic Association of 
Marine Insurers (Cefor) database (NoMIS) 
was scaled to fit the world fleet and used 
as a guide on amount of reported hull and 
machinery claims for the different flags. 
The results of the estimates on accident 
reporting performance are showed in  
table 1. 
3 
 
Reporting Performance 
Database NMD  MAIB Sea-Web™ 
Norway 
Sea-Web™ 
UK 
Best Case 65 % 89 % 57 % 25% 
Conditional Probability 38 % 57 % 34 % 16% 
Capture/ recapture 38 % 39 % 34 % 11% 
Up scaling of subset data 23% N/A  21 % 30 % 
Table 1 Study on reporting performance  (Hassel 2010)
Underreporting in such extensive scale 
would probably affect the outcome of any 
risk model if not being accounted for. The 
hazard identification process will probably 
be inaccurate and in turn affect the cost-
benefit results. Finally the whole risk 
management process may ebb away with 
insufficient decisions with respect to 
barriers required to obtain a desired safety 
integrity level or a maximum level of risk.  
During the last decade there have been a 
number of accidents with both serious 
consequences to crew, vessel and 
environment in Norway. Statistics from the 
Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) 
(NMD, 2009) points out a continuous rise 
in annually reported accidents from 17 in 
2000 to 34 in 2008. The same 
development seems to be valid also 
globally, according to Nordic Marine 
Insurers Statistics (NoMIS) (Cefor, 2009). 
The extent of the accidents „Full City‟ in 
2009, „Server‟ in 2007 and „Rocknes‟ in 
2004 brought the reality of oil spills to the 
Norwegian doorstep, by proving that 
severe accidents frequently occur in 
Norwegian coastal waters. 
Further, an ice free route through arctic 
waters and a growing potential for 
petroleum production in northern areas will 
likely increase the traffic along the 
Norwegian coast through the Northern 
Sea Route. Up to 2002 there was a 
moderate density of sea-born oil transport 
along the Norwegian coast. Suddenly the 
annual amount of oil transported from the 
Russian sector of the Barents region 
reached four million tons. In 2006 the 
same amount reached 10 million tons. The 
Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection 
and Emergency Planning (DSB) prediction 
for 2025 indicates an annual export from 
Russia between 45 – 80 million tons (DSB, 
2009). Knowing the real risk level formed 
by the present traffic pattern is essential in 
order to make satisfactory preparations 
with a growing traffic density in mind.  
1.2 Previous studies  
A previous study performed by Hassel and 
Hole (2009) showed that the content in the 
databases of the Norwegian Maritime 
Directorate (NMD), IMO‟s GISIS and the 
commercially operated Sea-Web was far 
from complete. A study on underreporting 
of tankers also showed a surprisingly low 
reporting performance for NMD (41 %) and 
Sea-Web™ (30 %) (Psarros et al, 2009).  
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Further, the phrase „safety culture‟ is 
widely used in this study. Soma (2004) 
stated that the concept has been explored 
for almost two decades, but that it still is a 
ongoing debate concerning its definition. 
Soma measured the safety culture through 
a Safety Management Attitude 
Questionnaire. Reason (1997) has also 
studied safety culture in an organizational 
perspective, providing useful models 
applicable for the marine industry. 
The aviation industry is known for being 
relatively more safety oriented than the 
maritime industry. Much can be learned 
from the aviation industry, especially when 
it comes to safety culture. “A Roadmap to 
a Just Culture” describes how an airline 
organization can improve their level and 
quality of reporting by trying to implement 
a just culture (Flight Safety Digest, 2005).    
1.3 Scope of Study 
Reporting of an accident from a vessel in 
distress or from a vessel exposed to a 
severe incident can be visualized as a 
chain of mechanical energy, similar to a 
simple propulsion line of a ship. Vital 
information can be lost in each link or the 
stream of information can even be 
completely stopped if links become 
broken. The different segments of actors 
included in this study are showed in the 
figure below.  
 
Figure  1 The reporting chain from vessel to 
investigation board 
This paper will primary focus on the 
underreporting issue in Norwegian waters 
and vessels connected to the Norwegian 
flag state. The British Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB) is included for 
comparative purposes. The master 
onboard a ship and the ship‟s manager 
are responsible of passing on information 
about accidents to the respective flag 
states. Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) 
and Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) are able 
to indirectly contribute with supplementary 
documentation based on their surveillance 
and correspondence with vessels in their 
area of responsibility. The accidents are 
finally reviewed by an Accident 
Investigation Board (AIB). 
2. Methodology 
The methods used in this study are 
chosen to assure that as much as possible 
of the reporting chain is covered. 
Interviews are used when information from 
specific actors are needed. Literature 
study is used to cover rules and 
regulations while analyses of reports are 
made to evaluate the reporting threshold. 
The author‟s personal experience from 
naval operations is used to complement 
some of the areas of interest for this study. 
Aspects in this study where personal 
experience is taken into account will be 
clearly expressed in this paper.     
2.1 Interview 
The preferred approach to collect data 
from ship owners and other actors within 
the reporting chain was done by 
interviews. This method enables 
immediate follow-up of issues and 
explanations. In-depth interviews are often 
used to provide context to quantitative 
outcome data. The technique also opens 
for a qualitative impression to be made 
with a small amount of interviewees 
(Boyce and Neale, 2006). Each interview 
was started with an initial telephone call 
giving a brief explanation of the study and 
a request for an interview. An interview 
question list was then sent by e-mail in 
order to let the respondent to prepare. The 
list was used as basis for further 
examination of procedures as various 
aspects were brought to author‟s attention. 
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The list of core questions to ship-
managers can be found in appendix 3. 
The focus of the interview was to, as far as 
possible, raise open questions in order to 
allow the respondent to answer as open -
hearted as possible. This means questions 
are started with phrases like “who is 
responsible for reporting of vessel 
accidents from ship to the onshore 
management?” rather than “is the master 
the one responsible for reporting 
accidents?”  However, it may be assumed 
that the context of this study may have 
affected the outcome of the answers 
given.  
Despite equal core questions for all the 
ship owners; the interviews developed in 
somewhat different directions as different 
aspects came to the surface. In two ship 
owner cases it was necessary to follow up 
the answers by an additional e-mail to 
clarify some of the arguments for further 
analysis.  
A questionnaire would probably be easier 
to distribute in a larger scale, and the input 
would have provided a greater collection 
of different reporting routines. On the other 
hand, a questionnaire excludes the 
possibility of an immediate follow-up of the 
answers given in order to reveal the 
underlying causes as to why 
underreporting is present. Interview was 
also used to gain information from the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration, the 
Norwegian Accident Investigation Board 
and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. 
2.2 Literature Studies  
Accident reporting procedures are 
regulated by rules and regulations, both 
nationally and internationally. In this study, 
the regulations are reviewed with respect 
to organizing of reporting and the way the 
aftermath of a reported accident is carried 
out. The legislations‟ capability to separate 
determination of culpability and accident 
investigation is also an aspect reviewed in 
this study.  
The regulations are also investigated with 
respect to its area of application, meaning 
which actors are obligated to report and 
what circumstances that must occur to 
warrant the reporting of an accident or 
incident. A comparative analysis is carried 
out between regulations covering reporting 
procedures for the maritime industry and 
the aviation industry to identify different 
practices. An analogue comparative   
analysis of regulations is also done 
between Norway, as a flag state, and 
United Kingdom.  
2.3 Threshold Analysis  
In order to gain a better insight in the 
threshold of reporting incidents, an 
analysis of voluntary reports has been 
carried out. Reports through quarterly 
feedback circulars from the UK 
Confidential Reporting Programme for 
Aviation and Maritime (CHIRP) were used 
to compare the content of reported 
incidents in the maritime and aviation 
industry (CHIRP, 2010). Each report is 
either a description of a specific hazardous 
incident or a highlight of circumstances in 
a working environment that is identified as 
a possible latent cause to an accident. The 
CHIRP-reports are further described in 
section 3.5. 
As the foundation of the threshold analysis 
is based upon voluntary effort, it must be 
taken into consideration that the reporter 
has already accepted reporting as a step 
to gain a safer working environment. The 
analysis is thus only valid for measuring 
the differences in the ability of self-
examination and the openness to share 
experience gained from self-induced 
incidents between the aviation- and 
maritime industry.  
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The two industries are not completely 
comparable due to the obvious differences 
in physical nature and their different 
operational pattern. However, their 
common factors are that both businesses 
are characterized by relatively complex 
operations that rely on close interactions 
between human performance and 
technical systems. In order to compare the 
reporting threshold for the two industries, 
the incident reports used in this analysis 
are divided in six different classifications, 
assumed valid for both parts. The 
classification is based on the causal 
relations claimed in the report, meaning 
whose acts leading to the incident or 
causing hazards. The classification is 
presented in the following sections: 
A. Self-induced incidents 
B. Colleague‟s conduct 
C. Own organization  
D. Co-operative organization 
E. Corresponding external 
organization 
F. Procedures & Equipment. 
Group A is incident reports when the 
reporter itself states that own actions were 
the prime source to the incident. Group A 
is characterized by poor decision-making 
or erroneous performance of assigned 
tasks. 
Group B incident reports are similar to 
Group A, but a colleague is deemed 
responsible for the erroneous acts.  
Group C is reports where conditions in 
own organizations do not fulfill the 
reporters premises to safety. Own 
organization is defined as the company or 
the branch that the reporter belongs to, for 
example the reporter‟s shipping company, 
airline or air traffic control department.    
Group D incident reports are incidents 
where the reporter is discontented with a 
co-operative organization‟s performances 
in a specific case or how the co-operative 
organization execute its duties overall. 
This may be the case if a master reports in 
a pilot or if an aviation pilot posts a report 
complaining on inadequate ATC-services.   
Group E is reports where the reporter 
imputes a person in a corresponding 
external organization for incorrectly 
perform his assignments. A Group E case 
is typically if a master report in another 
vessel‟s erroneous actions or if an airline 
pilot reports in another pilot.      
Group F is reports that refer to defectives 
to the procedures that form the safety 
framework of the business and connect 
the different organizations together. This 
may for instance be problem addressed to 
existing radio communication procedures. 
Note that reporters concerning about 
company‟s own standards and procedures 
are defined as a Group C case. Group F 
also includes reports where the addresser 
has revealed deviation from a technical 
component‟s required specification. 
Examples of each point A-F from both the 
aviation and maritime industry can be 
seen in appendix 1 and 2.  
Because the published reports are held 
confidential, it is in some cases difficult to 
classify the reporter role and its relation to 
the person or organization imputed in the 
report. It can for example be hard to 
identify whether the reporter is an ATC 
reporting in a pilot‟s (co-operative 
organization) conducts, or if he is a pilot 
reporting in another pilot (corresponding 
external organization). All cases of doubt 
are therefore excluded from this study  
The CHIRP-program also receives incident 
reports from the leisure yachting segment 
and the general aviation (GA) segment. 
These segments are exposed to the much 
of the same hazards as the merchant fleet 
and the airline industry. They are however 
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not placed under the same network of 
regulations setting requirement to neither 
personnel nor to equipment standard. 
Several of the reports submitted from 
these segments are therefore not relevant 
for the two industries. All leisure and GA 
reports are thereby excluded from this 
study, except reports on direct hazardous 
intervention between GA and airline 
industry or leisure yachting with merchant 
shipping. Results are presented in section 
4.5 
2.4 Safety Culture  
“Safety Culture has been considered a 
core aspect of organizational safety for the 
last two decades”. Despite a vague 
definition of what safety culture actually 
indicates, the expression cannot be 
omitted when it comes to reporting 
procedures (Soma, 2004). Openness, self-
examination and willingness to exchange 
and receive learning outcome of accidents 
and incidents must be fundamental 
attitudes when it comes to reporting seen 
from a safety culture perspective. The 
safety attitude must pervade the whole 
organization from deckhand to ship owner 
to actually being able to claim an upright 
safety culture. It may also be that a 
company, despite great effort never will 
reach their target of a safety culture. 
Sumwalt, Vice Chairman in the United 
States National Transportation Safety 
Board states: “A safety culture is 
something that is strived for, but rarely 
attained – The process is more important 
than the product” (Sumwalt, 2007). 
Besides revealing the actual reporting 
routines, the purpose of interviews, 
literature study and the threshold analysis 
was to gain a better understanding of the 
phrase safety culture when it comes to 
reporting. This can easily be summarized 
in two challenges: The employees‟ 
willingness to submit a report and the 
employers‟ openness to receive reports 
and share it with the interested parties. 
The cultural aspects are discussed in 
section 5.2 
3.  Material  
The central materials used for this study 
are described in the following sections. 
Findings of analyzing this material are 
presented in the results section.  
3.1 Rules and Regulations 
IMO has recently approved a new “Code 
of the International Standards and 
Recommended Practices for Safety 
Investigation (Casualty Investigation 
Code)” followed by a new regulation in the 
SOLAS convention making it mandatory to 
all flag states. The Casualty Investigation 
Code took effect on January 1st 2010. The 
objective of the new Code is to provide a 
common approach for states in the 
conduct of marine incident and accident 
investigations. The purpose of a marine 
safety investigation is, as defined by the 
code not to seek to apportion blame or 
determine liability, but to prevent 
casualties and incidents to happen in the 
future (IMO, 2008). 
The Code sets standards and points out 
recommended practices, but allows 
interfering national laws to take 
precedence of the investigation of an 
accident. This meaning if a person is 
required to provide evidence, the Code 
suggest that this evidences should be 
prevented from admission into civil or 
criminal proceedings as far as this 
restriction do not conflict with existing 
national laws. 
Vessels in Norwegian waters and 
Norwegian flagged vessels (NOR/NIS) are 
required to follow the accident reporting 
procedures set by Norwegian legislation: 
“Forskrift om melde- og rapporteringsplikt 
ved sjøulykker og andre hendelser til sjøs” 
(FOR-744, 2008) which translates to: 
8 
 
“Regulations of compulsory reporting of 
sea accidents and other Incidents at sea”. 
The national regulations demands any 
vessel involved by its area of application to 
report incidents as defined to NMD using a 
standard form (NMD, 2008). 
Similar to the Norwegian regulation of sea 
accidents, reporting of aviation accidents 
are placed under an equivalent regulation: 
“Forskrift om varslings- og 
rapporteringsplilkt i forbindelse med 
luftfartsulykker mv., og om lagring, 
utveksling og utlevering av rapporterte 
opplysninger” (FOR-1393, 2006), which 
translates to “Regulation on compulsory 
noticing and reporting of aviation accidents 
and storage, exchange and distribution of 
reported information”. The Norwegian 
legislation regulating aviation reporting 
procedures industry covers a wider range 
of actors and includes a more 
comprehensive description of reporting of 
incidents than the maritime legislation.  
Accidents involving any United Kingdom 
flagged ship or vessels conducting 
voyages in United Kingdom waters shall 
follow the reporting routines given in “The 
Merchant Shipping (accident Reporting 
and Investigation) Regulations 2005”. The 
reregulation came into force after a 
regulatory impact assessment was 
conducted in March 2005 (MAIB, 2005). It 
is of interest to compare the assessment 
and the UK regulation with the existing 
Norwegian legislation to see whether 
experience and practices can be 
transferred to decrease underreporting in 
Norway. 
3.2 Flag State 
According to the IMO Casualty 
Investigation Code, each flag state is 
responsible for investigating any casualty 
occurring to any of its ships when it judges 
that such an investigation may assist in 
improving existing regulations. It also 
states that the flag state has the right to 
investigate any casualty within their 
territorial seas. In Norway, investigation of 
a maritime accident is treated according to 
LOV 1994-06-24 nr 39:”Lov om sjøfarten” 
(Lov 1994 nr 39), which translates to “The 
Maritime Code”.  
After July 1st 2008 a new regime for 
investigation of accidents was introduced 
in Norway. Odelsting Proposition number 
78 2003-2004 was published to notify 
changes in the Norwegian Maritime Code 
(Ot.prp no 78, 2003-2004). Earlier 
inspection of accidents was carried out by 
Norwegian Maritime Directorate through 
the institute of maritime declaration. This 
task is now performed by Accident 
Investigation Board Norway (AIBN). NMD 
still holds the responsibility of receiving 
accident reports as well as responsibility of 
inspection of Norwegian registered 
vessels and foreign vessels within 
Norwegian waters (AIBN, 2010; Brattfoss, 
2010).  
This paper will discuss the ripple effects 
caused by the separation of the division 
receiving reports and the division 
investigating the reported incidents. This 
study will also verify interviewed ship 
owners‟ statements about the feedback 
provided by the Norwegian flag state 
authorities. Results are presented in 
section 4.3.  
3.3 Other Contributors 
Coastal administration and rescue 
coordination centre are organizations 
connected to accidents in several ways. 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration 
(NCA) is responsible for VTS and pilot 
services for vessels in Norwegian waters. 
The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre 
(JRCC) is often organizing the search and 
rescue effort through the coastal radio 
stations. NCA and JRCC are thus ensuring 
some degree of surveillance of vessels in 
Norwegian waters with respect to 
accidents (Ski, 2010; Sveinungsen, 2010). 
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Their capability of accident detection and 
their potential to compensate for lacking 
information has been investigated as a 
part of this study. The results are 
presented in section 4.4. 
3.4 Ship Owners 
In all four Norwegian ship owners were 
interviewed about their reporting 
procedures and their challenges related to 
the reporting issue. The selection covers 
different segments within the maritime 
industry. All of the ship owners were 
represented by their HSEQ-department. A 
brief introduction of the ship owners is 
given in the following sections.  
Höegh Autoliners (Höegh) operates 
approximate 30 RORO vessels, mainly 
carrying cars worldwide. The vessels are 
mostly Norwegian (NIS) or Bahamas 
flagged. The onboard crew consists of 
either only Philippine or only Chinese 
personnel (Jørgensen, 2010). 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen (Wilhelmsen) owns 31 
RORO vessels and are managing 132 
vessels in total. The fleet consist of mostly 
truck carriers (80 %) and some pure car 
carriers (10 %) all operating worldwide. 
Owned vessels are either NIS or UK 
flagged while managed vessels are 
operated under several different flags, 
providing a widely basis of comparison. 
The crew is made up form a mixture of 
nationalities (Svensson, 2010). 
Odfjell Tankers (Odfjell) manages 55 
worldwide operating chemical tankers, 
equally distributed to NIS and 
Singaporean flags. The officers are mainly 
Norwegian while the rest of the crew 
consist of Eastern Asian nationalities, 
mostly Philippine (Sørenes, 2010). 
Farstad Shipping (Farstad) operates 32 
AHTS vessels and 23 PSV vessels 
providing services for the offshore oil and 
gas industry. The company is, for the time 
being, conducting operations in Brazil, the 
North Sea and in the Far East (Australia). 
The fleet is sailing under the flags 
Australia, Brazil, Isle of Man, Norway 
(NOR/NIS) and Singapore (Stuen, 2010). 
The object of the ship owner interviews 
were to examine the quality of the 
procedures and whether absence of 
reporting accidents can be rooted in one 
or more of the causes below (IMO, 2005): 
 violation (deliberate decision to act 
against a rule or plan) 
 slip (unintentional action where 
failure involves attention) 
 lapse (unintentional action where 
failure involves memory) 
 mistake (an intentional action 
where there is an error in the 
planning process; there is no 
deliberate decision to act against a 
rule or procedure) 
The object is not to denounce any of the 
interviewed ship owners. Findings 
indicating violations or questionable 
behavior or opinions will not be presented 
by name.   
3.5 UK Confidential Reporting 
Programme for Aviation and Maritime 
“Confidential Human Factors Incident 
Reporting Programme” when referring to 
the aviation division or “Confidential 
Hazardous Incident Reporting 
Programme” when referring to the 
maritime division are both abbreviated 
CHRIP. The aim of CHIRP is to contribute 
to a safer enhancement in the aviation and 
maritime industry by providing an 
independent and confidential reporting 
system available for all individuals 
employed in the industries.  
CHIRP is following up the matter of each 
reported issue on any safety related 
matter by addressing it to those who can 
remedy the problem. The report is made 
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publicly available and presented in 
quarterly feedback if approved by the 
reporter. Personal information are kept 
confidential throughout the process and 
destroyed on closure of report. The CHIRP 
marine division has been operative since 
July 2003, while the division for aviation 
has been in operation since 1982. CHIRP 
maritime annually receives approximately 
110 reports of which half normally are 
received from leisure yachting (CHIRP, 
2010; Rowsell, 2010). 
The aviation reports used in the threshold 
analysis are gained from quarterly air 
transport feedbacks no 88-93 covering the 
time from autumn 2008 to winter 2009, 
providing 67 valid entries. The marine 
reports used are obtained from the 
quarterly feedbacks no 12-26 covering the 
period from winter 2006 to summer 2010 
providing 66 valid entries.  
4. Results 
A top view examination of the actors in the 
accident reporting chain indicates a certain 
degree of redundancy of the system 
providing information about an accident, 
meaning that the stream of information 
can initially travel alternative routes. 
However the links between components 
are vulnerable to breaches. The 
alternative routes through VTS or RCC are 
also weakened by their limited efficacy  to 
reveal accidents.  
 
 
Figure  2 Reporting reliability block diagram 
When looking at single accidents, 
breakage between one of the links in the 
upper part of figure 2 will result in 
underreporting, meaning that the figure 
can be interpreted as a reliability block 
diagram. In a more global perspective of 
accident reporting, each of the 
components can be assign individual 
efficiency losses, meaning that the figure 
express the efficiency of the system.  
Findings for each component are given in 
the subsequent sections.  
4.1 Ship Owners 
During a military exercise off the 
Norwegian Coast in April 2010 the author 
sailed as the Commanding Officer on the 
Naval Home Guard vessel „Halten‟. A 
distress call was relayed from a rescue 
vessel, in the close proximity to the 
exercise area, asking for tug assistance 
(Olsen, 2010). Upon arrival a 110 meter 
long coastal freighter were seen drifting 
towards a reef, at a distance of 
approximately half a nautical mile. The 
author later learned that the vessel in 
distress had made contact with the rescue 
vessel by telephone asking for “immediate 
piloting assistance” without mentioning 
anything about loss of propulsion.  
This odd behavior was probably done to 
protect the ship owner from paying 
salvage claim, which might have been the 
case if a proper VHF Mayday or Pan-Pan 
procedure had been followed. Propulsion 
was later regained after a successful tow 
was completed ensuring that grounding 
was avoided. 
Olsen (2010), the master on the rescue 
vessel later told that the ship owner made 
directly contact with the rescue vessel 
berating him for making a public notice on 
the maritime VHF. The ship owner also 
begged the towing lines to be dropped and 
stated that no money would be paid for the 
rescue operation.  
According to Olsen, this particular event is 
a text book example of an incident which 
is tried to be covered up. With respect to 
the reporting regulations this incident 
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should also be properly reported. The 
Norwegian reporting regulations state that 
“an event leading to immediate danger to 
environment, vessel or personnel should 
be reported as a sea accident” (FOR-744, 
2008). When the author left the scene the 
ship‟s master promised that the vessel 
should sail directly to the nearest yard and 
sort out the machinery problem. AIS-
tracking showed that the vessel continued 
directly to its original destination. The 
incident was subsequently not reported 
and is not found in the NMD database as 
of May 2010. 
All interviewed ship owners have specific 
procedures for reporting accidents from 
vessel to the onshore organization. 
Although all interviewees stated that all 
accidents are reported to the land based 
organization, variation was found in the 
communication lines providing flag states  
with information. For Odfjell, all reports to 
flag states are conveyed through HSEQ-
division. Höegh, Wilhelmsen, and Farstad 
allow personnel injuries to be directly 
reported from vessel (Master) to flag state 
while vessel accident reports are 
conveyed through ship owners‟ HSEQ-
division. The familiarization with different 
flag state‟s legislation with respect to 
reporting procedures were poor for most of 
the ship owners. Odfjell was the only 
company claiming to be well informed of 
regulations in their area of operation. 
(Jørgensen, 2010; Stuen, 2010; 
Svensson, 2010; Sørenes, 2010)  Findings 
from the core questions are displayed in 
table 2: 
     Höegh Autoliners Wilh. Wilhelmsen Odfjell Tankers Farstad Shipping 
Reporting System 
Accidents/Incidents 
Same EDB-system for 
Ship and Org. 
Same EDB-system for 
Ship and Org. 
In-house procedures of 
communication chain. 
 
Same EDB-system for 
Ship and Org. 
System Access 
Crew/Organization 
All parties can submit 
reports. Reports 
generally submitted by 
Masters. 
 
All parties can submit 
reports. 
Reports generally 
submitted by crew 
division leader. 
All parties can submit 
reports. Reports 
generally submitted by 
Masters. 
 
Master, 1
st
 Officer and 
Chief Eng. have access. 
Reports generally 
written by division 
leaders. 
 
Flag State 
Communication 
Vessel accidents are 
conveyed by HSEQ 
department. Personnel 
injuries are directly 
reported. 
 
Vessel accidents are 
conveyed by HSEQ 
department. Personnel 
injuries are directly 
reported. 
 
All accidents are 
conveyed by ship owner 
to flag state. 
Vessel accidents are 
conveyed by HSEQ 
department. Personnel 
injuries are directly 
reported. 
Internationally 
Reporting of accidents 
to other than own F.S.   
Rely on assistance from 
insurance and local 
agents. 
 
Rely on assistance from 
insurance and local 
agents. 
 
Same Routines used in 
all areas. Reports 
submitted to own F.S.  
 
Uses local office to 
assure actual 
regulations are obeyed.  
Incident Reporting 
Procedures for 
reporting incidents 
Crew invited to report.  
Experience challenges 
due to different onboard 
cultures. 
Minor incidents not 
reported. Some trouble 
with incomplete 
information provided. 
Customers set 
standards to reporting 
of incidents. 
Crew committed to 
report. Experience 
some threshold of self- 
induced incidents.  
Table 2 Ship owner general results
4.1.1 Ship Owners’ Culture 
Höegh states that the extent of reports is 
dependent on the superintendent‟s 
requested level. According to Jørgensen 
(2010), the company does also experience 
a low degree of reporting from junior 
officers and ratings. The officers working in 
Höegh are normally long term contractors 
(years), while junior officers are employed 
for shorter periods (quarters). Ratings are 
sailing on even shorter contracts and are 
often exchanged between voyages. Short 
periods of employment are subsequently 
making it hard to implement the company‟s 
culture. It also turns out to be a significant 
difference between onboard nationalities. 
Philippine crewmembers seem to be more 
active on reporting incidents than their 
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Chinese colleagues. Jørgensen believe 
this may be due to fear of reprisals or 
being fired (Jørgensen, 2010). 
Stuen (2010) inform that Farstad 
experience little reporting on self-induced 
incidents, though this trend is about to 
change. Installation and handling of 
offshore equipment depends on correct 
decision and will often leave no room for 
error. Farstad is therefore trying to lower 
this threshold for being able to improve the 
operation procedures.  
The selection of ship owner shows unlike 
tendencies to use available material in 
their risk assessment. One company has 
full time employees gathering relevant 
data through reports and safety circulars 
to supplement their work in identifying 
hazards. Another company uses input 
from business related forums for 
benchmark purposes. The other 
companies are identifying hazards using 
only self produced input and guidance 
from insurance companies.  
4.1.2 Ship Owners’ Incident Reporting 
Scheme  
All interviewed companies are requesting 
their crew to report incidents in one way or 
another. Farstad has even made incident 
reporting mandatory by implement rules in 
the standard operating procedure (SOP). 
Until recently an award were issued to the 
vessel with the highest level of reports. 
This practice is now ended as reporting of 
incidents is regarded as one of the daily 
duties (Jørgensen, 2010). 
 
Wilhelmsen does also mention 
improvement of operating procedures as 
their reason for requesting incident 
reports. The statement is also supported 
by Höegh, that claim that incident 
reporting is wanted for reducing risk, not 
necessarily to fulfill the ISM requirements 
(Jørgensen, 2010; Svensson, 2010).  
 
Odfjell and Farstad also mention 
customers‟ requirement to safety as a 
central reason to implement an in-
house incident reporting program. 
Their customers evaluate several 
attributes in their operator selection 
process. The operators safety records 
and safety management is one of the 
important decision variables. A system 
of reporting procedures is also required 
to obtain ISO 9001(Quality 
Management System) and ISO 
14001(Environmental Management 
System) (Sørenes, 2010; Stuen, 2010). 
Despite the fact that all the interviewed 
companies had an in-house scheme 
for incident reporting, none of them 
were sharing the information with any 
flag state.  
4.1.3 Ship Owners’ Communication 
Line to Flag States 
Three of the interviewed ship owners 
(Farstad, Höegh and Wilhelmsen) told that 
if an accident occurs they would first 
inform the agent and insurance company. 
The three also stated that if an accident 
occurs in an area where the national 
regulations are unknown, they rely on 
agent and insurance to help out fulfilling 
the mandatory reporting procedures 
(Jørgensen, 2010; Stuen, 2010; 
Svensson, 2010).    
One ship owner (anonymous) emphasize 
that vessels put on hold due to an 
investigation is perceived very 
unfavorable. Customers do often have 
stakes in cargo, terminals and even the 
vessel itself. A vessel put on hold for 
longer periods makes it difficult to trade 
the ship and may also deteriorate the 
customer relationship. 
Svensson (2010) seek more relevant 
feedback from flag states, Norway in 
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particular. In his opinion, safety circulars 
oriented by branch would be much 
appreciated for company Wilhelmsen. 
Statistics and trend developments would 
be of great interest for the onshore 
organization. Further Svensson states that 
memorandums must be constructed in 
way that makes it easy for crew members, 
in each ship department, to identify 
themselves with hazards pinpointed. 
Svensson exemplifies case like “what 
have gone wrong with RORO-vessels 
ventilation systems?” and “what hazards 
are identified in the galley?”. 
Likewise Jørgensen (2010) states that 
Höegh receives a very limited amount of 
feedback from the Norwegian flag state. 
Jørgensen considers NMD and AIBN as 
reactive organizations meaning that only 
serious accidents are investigated and 
little proactive information provided. 
Jørgensen believe more resources should 
be spend on analyzing less serious 
accidents, thus more proactive information 
can be shared among the marine industry.  
Stuen (2010) request more information for 
the offshore supply branch of the industry. 
Higher focus should be given to near 
misses as this may provide essential 
learning outcome. On the other side, 
Stuen experience a small amount of 
companies willing to share their empirical 
casualty data. Stuen believe flag state 
organization of an anonymous 
presentation of status quo and trend 
development could have improved the 
reporting performance. 
4.2 Rules and Regulations 
4.2.1 IMO Casualty Investigation Code 
IMO (2008) recognizes that each flag state 
has a duty to conduct an investigation to 
any casualty to its ship when it judges that 
investigation may assist in developing 
rules and regulations thus preventing 
accidents to happen in the future.  A 
marine casualty is in the Casualty 
Investigation Code (chapter 2.9) defined 
as: an event or sequence of events that 
has resulted in any of the following which 
has occurred directly in connection with 
operation of a ship: 
1. the death of, serious injury to a 
person; 
2. the loss of a person from a ship; 
3. the loss, presumed loss or 
abandonment of a ship; 
4. material damage to a ship; 
5. the stranding or disabling of a ship, 
or the involvement of a ship in 
collision;  
6. material damage to marine 
infrastructure external to a ship that 
could seriously endanger the safety 
of the ship, another ship or an 
individual; or 
7. severe damage to the environment, 
or the potential for severe damage 
to the environment, brought about 
by the damage of a ship or ships.  
The Casualty Investigation Code (chapter 
6.1) also states that “a marine safety 
investigation shall be conducted into every 
very serious marine casualty” where a very 
serious casualty indicates a total loss of 
the ship, fatality or severe damage to the 
environment. Also, in chapter 11.1 in the 
Casualty Investigation Code, it is stated 
that investigation of an accident shall be 
impartial, objective and conducted without 
interference from any other body that may 
affect its outcome. Chapter 16 in the Code 
requires investigation to be fully 
independent from judicial proceedings and 
all other bodies that in some way or 
another are involved in the casualty or 
incident (IMO, 2010).   
4.2.2 Norwegian Maritime Reporting 
Procedures 
Norwegian legislation for marine reporting 
procedures (FOR-744, 2008) is setting 
requirement to Norwegian flagged vessels 
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and vessels in Norwegian waters. The 
legislation defines accident as “when 
fatality, serious injury or considerable 
damage is charged to vessel, cargo, 
environment or external assets due to 
operation of a vessel; or when an incident 
in connection with operation of a vessel 
lead to immediate danger to any 
consequences mention in the first part. 
Chapter 2, §4 in the legislations states that 
any sea accident, working accident or 
incidents involving grounding or collision 
occur, notifications requesting assistance 
should be directly radioed to one of the 
costal radio stations or to JRCC by either 
the master or the ship owner. A vessel 
outside the JRCC area of responsibility 
may instead report to the local RCC. 
Chapter 3 in the legislation demands the 
vessel‟s master or the ship owner to report 
all accidents described in §4 to NMD, 
using a specified form, within 72 hours 
from the accident. The legislation do not 
demand any other actors like JRCC, VTS, 
costal radios, insurance company or repair 
yards to report accidents they may be 
aware of. 
4.2.3 Norwegian Aviation Reporting 
Procedures  
The Norwegian legislation for aviation 
reporting procedures (FOR-1393, 2006) is 
valid for all civil aircraft within the 
Norwegian airspace and to all Norwegian 
registered aircrafts. However, the aviation 
legislation is far more complex than its 
corresponding maritime legislation. First of 
all, the legislation separates all events into 
the classes: 
1. aviation accident 
2. serious aviation incident 
3. non serious aviation incident 
4. injury 
5. technical failure 
Secondly the legislation covers a far wider 
range of actors compared to the maritime 
legislation. The following list represents all 
actors covered by the aviation routines: 
 
a. captain 
b. flight crew 
c. operator (the responsible leader) 
d. owner 
e. flight control services (ATC, 
communication , navigation, 
surveillance, weather services 
and notice services) 
f. ground services (airport 
administrations, engineers, other 
that in some way are employed in 
the ground services) 
g. producer of parts and equipment 
(the technical officer) 
Finally it distinguishes between immediate 
noticing procedures and reporting 
procedures for all the given events and 
actors. Noticing is defined as immediate 
warning of an event (serious or not) by 
using the quickest means available, while 
reporting is defined as a written report 
submitted to the officials. In total the 
legislation forms extensive notice- and 
reporting routines for the actors (a-g) in 
events (1-5). §12-24 in the regulation also 
forbids all information received form actors 
a-g to be used in court.  
4.2.4 United Kingdom Marine Reporting 
Routines 
In March 2005 MAIB published a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment on “The 
Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting 
and Investigation) Regulations 2005”. The 
objective of the assessment was to 
improve efficiency and efficacy (MAIB, 
2005).  
As stated in the assessment, MAIB 
indentified a problem on underreporting of 
accidents, partially due to foreign ship 
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owners and masters not knowing to the 
required reporting routines. Approximately 
50 accidents were known through press or 
other sources, but not reported each year. 
A proposed chance to the regulations was 
to include more actors in the maritime 
industry to be placed under mandatory 
reporting procedures.  
Another indentified problem was that 
results from MAIB investigation were used 
to determinate liability. A purposed change 
to the regulations was that information 
received through inspection should not be 
available for judicial proceedings without a 
court order. Declarations from witnesses 
were also believed to be confined with 
respect to the fact that witnesses were 
allowed to have representatives present at 
all times during the interviews. This regime 
did not work as intended as lawyers trying 
to limit the company‟s reputation, by 
hindering the witnesses to speak openly.  
Up to 2005 MAIB had addressed over 
2000 safety recommendations to ship 
owners, but the current legislation did not 
require any of the addressees to respond. 
Estimates showed that about 1 in 14 
recommendations received no response.   
On April 18th 2005 the new (post 
assessment) “Merchant Shipping (accident 
Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 
2005” came into force, presenting a much 
more extensive and effective regulation 
than the existing Norwegian regulation. 
The following sections describe prominent 
differences A-F between the two flag 
states: 
A. Actors. The new regulations cover 
a wider range of actors by 
providing representatives from 
local harbor authorities, Marine and 
Coastguard Agency and inland 
waterway authorities to be placed 
under mandatory reporting routines 
in addition to the ship‟s owner and 
the ship‟s crew (regulation 6).   
  
B. Self examination. Regulation 6 §4 
states that the ship‟s master and/or 
owner shall, as far as reasonably 
possible, immediately examine the 
circumstances for any accident or 
injury. The findings and the 
measures taken to prevent 
reoccurrence shall be reported to 
the Chief Inspector. The Chief 
Inspector may decide if further 
inspection is necessary or not 
based on preliminary findings 
provided from ship‟s master or 
owner (regulation 7). 
 
C. Collection of evidence. 
Regulation 9 §1 points out that 
charts, log books, voyage data 
recorder and other documents that 
may be of interest should be 
preserved upon an accident for 
investigation purposes. § 9 clearly 
states that an investigation 
inspector cannot require a ship to 
remain longer than is necessary 
and shall ensure that evidences 
are collected expeditiously. 
 
D. Protection of witnesses. 
Regulation 5 §2 state that the sole 
objective is not to determine liability 
nor, as far as possible, to apportion 
blame. The statement is also 
followed by regulation 12 saying 
that disclosure of records made 
shall not be made available for 
purposes other than investigation 
unless a court orders otherwise. 
Regulation 10 §5 allows the Chief 
Inspector to exclude any person 
(except lawyers acting solely on 
behalf of the interviewee) to be 
present at an oral examination of a 
witness.  
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E. The closed loop. Regulation 15 
states that any recommendation 
received from the Chief Inspector 
must be considered and followed 
up by a case document providing 
the measures taken or reasoning 
why no measures are 
implemented. The regulation also 
states that the recommendation 
shall be made public available 
when the Chief Inspectors judges 
that the results may be of interest 
of others than the primary receiver.  
 
F. Penalty. Regulation 18 states that 
a person who, without reasonable 
causes, fails to follow the reporting 
regulations can be given a fine up 
to level 5 (£ 5000). 
4.3 Flag State 
Until July 1st 2008 investigation of 
accidents was conducted by a NMD in a 
process called “Sjøforklaring”, translated to 
“maritime declaration”. The object of this 
process was to determine both the 
question of guilt and the factors causing 
the accident. This mixture of these tasks 
was regarded as a problem as actors 
involved in the declaration process were 
afraid for prosecution. The statutory 
declaration process was also criticized for 
poor efficiency and rarely on-scene 
inspections. In the light of these factors a 
new regime was introduced, directing 
accident investigation to be conducted by 
AIBN with the sole purpose to develop 
existing regulations, routines and 
standards in order to prevent accidents to 
happen (Ot.prp no 78, 2003-2004). 
Despite introducing a new regime, 
accident investigation in Norway is still 
criticized among ship owners as presented 
in section 4.1.3. Brattfoss, one of the eight 
accident investigators at AIBN states that 
a significant share of received cases is not 
investigated due to their limited working 
capacity. AIBN aims at investigating all 
serious accidents involving fatality or 
damage to the environment. For accidents 
or incidents that are not investigated, the 
respondent receives a note informing the 
case is dropped (Brattfoss, 2010). 
In the period from the start-up in 2008 to 
2009 AIBN received reports on 20 
accidents (appendix 4) obligated to 
investigation according to the Norwegian 
Maritime Code. On this point, only eleven 
of the accident investigation reports are 
published, two investigations are canceled 
due to limited resources and seven are not 
yet completed. In the same period 211 
accidents, not obligated to investigation, 
were reported to AIBN where only three 
investigation reports are made available 
so far (AIBN, 2010).  
The Norwegian Accident Investigation 
Board has another approach than MAIB 
when it comes to protection of information 
provided through investigation for other 
use than intended. Brattfoss (2010) states 
that AIBN and the prosecuting authority, 
represented by the Police, often share the 
facts and evidences gained through an 
investigation. Further, Brattfoss states that 
AIBN intend to keep the interpretation and 
analysis themselves, inaccessible for 
others until the investigation report is 
published. Every AIBN report made public 
available are given inscription as the 
following excerpt from the „Full City‟ 
investigation report: 
 “AIBN has compiled this report for the sole purpose of 
improving safety at sea. The object of a safety 
investigation is to clarify the sequence of events and root 
cause factors, study matters of significance for the 
prevention of maritime accidents and improvement of 
safety at sea, and to publish a report with eventually safety 
recommendations. The Board shall not apportion any 
blame or liability. Use of this report for any other purpose 
than for improvements of the safety at sea should be 
avoided.”   
Regardless of the effort to protect their 
findings to be used in determination of 
guilt or apportion of blame, Brattfoss says 
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they cannot prevent the investigation 
report from giving the Police a hint for 
where to look (Brattfoss, 2010). However, 
the practices seems to be totally different. 
In the „Full City‟ case, the AIBN‟s 
preliminary investigation report was 
presented as evidence in court and was 
used to determine whether the captain and 
1st Officer should be remand in custody or 
not. The case was appealed and the 
report was subsequently also presented 
as evidence in higher instances. Also the 
investigation report from the AIB of 
Antigua and Barbuda was presented as 
evidence in the court determining the 
compensation in the aftermath of the 
„Rocknes‟ accident in 2004 (Hanevold N., 
2009). 
According to the recent study on 
underreporting (Hassel 2010), the 
situational awareness of the Norwegian 
flag state seems to be insufficient. Today, 
AIBN receives most of their information 
directly from NMD whilst a few numbers of 
incidents are reported directly from JRCC. 
Besides that, AIBN does not hold any 
records on how many accidents that are 
not reported. Serious accidents or injuries 
are often intercepted by the press before 
being reported to AIBN, thus 
underreporting is therefore not regarded 
as a major issue (Brattfoss, 2010). In a 
previous study on databases (Hassel and 
Hole 2009) NMD was interviewed 
regarding their way of collecting and 
receiving information. Results showed that 
The results showed that nor NMD was 
aware of the underreporting issue. No 
actions are taken to try to determine the 
extent of underreporting other than 
sporadic check-up with other databases 
(Bakkevig, 2009). 
4.4 Other Contributors 
As presented in section 4.2.2 neither the 
VTS nor JRCC are compulsory reporting 
contributors with respect to the Norwegian 
legislation. They may however be useful 
informants providing complementary 
information of accident they may be aware 
of.  
In Norway there are four VTS-centers are 
monitoring respective areas where traffic 
density is high and where dangerous 
goods are transported close to shore. In 
addition one VTS-center (VTS NOR) is 
given the responsibility to monitor all 
movements along the coast of Norway, 
from the boarder to Russia in the north to 
the Swedish border in the south. The VTS-
centers use AIS and VHF radio 
communication as primary input in their 
surveillance. Vessels with an indentified 
suspicious behavior are contacted and 
diverted using one of the costal radio 
stations. Incidents leading to a high 
probability of environmental damage are 
reported to NMD (Ski, 2010). 
In 2007 VTS NOR introduced a new traffic 
separation scheme (TSS) to reduce 
probability of collision, but also to make it 
easier to monitor the ship movement. The 
TSS is both manually and electronically 
monitored allowing a filtration of vessels‟ 
AIS-track. The filter will automatically 
alarm the controllers if the speed of a 
vessel gets below a certain limit. This 
meaning ships running aground or 
exposed to engine failure are detected by 
the VTS-centre (Sveinungsen, 2010)  
As for the VTS-centers, the Joint Rescue 
Coordination Center (JRCC) possesses a 
unique position to pass on first hand 
information about accidents as JRCC 
often is the first to know about an accident. 
In 2009 JRCC received a total of 3243 sea 
related accidents covering both the 
leisure- and merchant sector (JRCC, 
2009). It stands to believe that many of 
these accidents are not of interest to 
AIBN, but still mandatory reporting could 
have improved the situational awareness.   
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4.5 Threshold Analysis 
 
Figure  3 Results of threshold analysis 
 
Figure 3 displays the results of the 
comparative threshold analysis. The most 
significant difference between the two 
industries is the amount of reports 
submitted on in-house problems. Six out of 
ten reports submitted from the air transport 
industry are dealing with issues within 
internal bounds, meaning that a proposed 
improvement is desired for the reporter 
itself, the colleagues or the organization 
managing the company. The equivalent 
sections for the maritime industry do only 
make up 21 %.  
The maritime industry shows a greater 
tendency to blame other, corresponding 
external organizations, as exemplified: one 
ship‟s master blaming another for not 
following “The International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea” (Colregs). 
More ideally, if the threshold of reporting in 
own mistakes and colleagues‟ mistakes 
was as low as reporting in others‟ 
mistakes, these parts should have been 
equivalent big  
The aviation industry also submits a 
relatively lager amount of reports issued 
on co-operative organizations e.g. a pilot 
reporting in the conducts of an ATC-
service. This fact can probably be 
explained by the aviation industry being 
more dependent on co-operative 
organizations such as ATC, airport 
authority, and other various ground based 
workers (de-icing etc.).   
Perhaps the most important result of this 
analysis is the threshold of reporting in 
personal errors. None of the maritime 
reports were issued based on self-induced 
mistakes. The aviation industry comes 
forward by having a higher degree of 
reporting in self-induced incidents thus 
being fairly low, meaning improvements 
could be done to both parties. The actors 
in aviation industry also show that they are 
relatively better to indentify latent causes 
in their own organization that potentially 
may lead to an accident. The fact that the 
amount of reported incidents is much 
higher for the aviation industry also speaks 
for itself. The results sorted on the 
feedback for the air transport industry and 
the maritime industry can be seen in 
appendix 5 and 6.   
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5. Discussion  
The findings indicate deficiencies in all of 
the components in the reporting chain. All 
the actors have areas where improvement 
could be done. The Norwegian legislation 
for marine reporting procedures seems to 
be somewhat incomplete with respect to 
its scope and extent and also in the way it 
separates investigation and question of 
quilt. Comparison with the United 
Kingdom‟s regulations for marine accident 
reporting and the Norwegian regulation for 
aviation accident reporting, show that 
Norway can develop their maritime 
legislation even further.  
The ship owner findings indicate naïve 
attitudes by believing reporting of 
accidents and fulfilling regulations are 
secured through other parties like shipping 
agents or insurance companies, which in 
the best case be defined as a slip or lapse.  
No evidences form neither NMD nor AIBN 
indicates this being a part of the today‟s 
practice. The ship owner findings also 
point out that the regulation in some way 
can be violated by intentionally not report 
in accidents in fear of a ship being put on 
hold.  
The comparative threshold analysis points 
out that the aviation industry is more 
mature compared to the maritime industry. 
The actors in the aviation industry show a 
lower threshold to report individual 
incidents and keep a higher focus on 
aspects in their own organization. This 
may indicate a better understanding of 
reporting as an effectively tool to improve 
safety.    
The result section is saturated by aspects 
regarding legislation, motivation to report 
and cultural challenges. It seems that 
these also are the aspects that affect the 
overall underreporting issue. The following 
sections provide an interpretation of the 
results and states out some measures to 
improve reporting performance.               
5.1 Legislation efficiency and efficacy 
The today‟s legal usage seems to be 
rooted in previous regime‟s practices 
where the maritime declaration was used 
to determine quilt and causal factors, 
which is conflicting with IMO‟s Casualty 
Investigation Code. A wrong use of 
investigation reports may also presumably 
frighten actors in the maritime industry to 
report in events, even though reporting is 
made mandatory. The regulation should 
be made clearer and forbid evidences 
found during investigation to be used in 
court, like the analog regulation for 
aviation industry.  
The regulation may also be changed to 
involve more actors in the mandatory 
reporting chain. Some of the intelligence 
caught by JRCC and the VTS-centers are 
already relayed as a part of “best 
practices”, but a change in the regulation 
would necessitate these practices to be 
implemented on a regular basis. MAIB 
estimated in their Regulatory Impact 
Assessment that an equivalent change in 
the British regulation would increase 
reporting performance with up to 3,6 % 
(MAIB, 2005). If turning to the aviation 
industry an even more extensive range of 
actors can be seen. Table 3 is a tempting 
proposal of mandatory maritime reporting 
actors based on the Norwegian aviation 
regulation. 
Aviation Industry Maritime Industry 
Captain Master 
Flight Crew Vessel Crew 
Operator Ship Manager/ Agent 
Owner Ship Owner 
Flight Control Services 
 
VTS, RCC, Harbor Authority 
Ground Services Repair Yard, Classification 
Society 
 
Producers of Aircraft and 
Components 
Ship Yards, Component 
Manufacturers 
    Table 3 Transfer of mandatory reporting actors   
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Findings from both AIBN and ship owners 
indicated that limited resources lead to 
many less serious cases being dropped. 
The British MAIB-regulations require a 
ship‟s master or owner to conduct self-
examination upon an accident, on which  
the Chief Inspectors stands freely to 
decide whether a further investigation is 
necessary or not. This practice insure that 
less serious accidents will be treated 
instead of dropped and that potential 
“lesson learned” can be received, stored 
and distributed to other interested parties.   
5.2 Motivation  
It stands to reason that the answers given 
from the ship owners where true. On the 
other hand it is also reasonable to believe 
that some of their known causes to why 
the reporting procedures are not followed 
are not disclosed, especially causes 
identified as violations or mistakes (section 
3.4) However, the ship owners results 
indicated that absence of reporting can be 
rooted in all the causes, violation, slip, 
lapse and mistake resulting in breakages 
in the link between ship owners and flag 
state.   
The importance of a seemingly 
immaculate reputation is also brought to 
the author‟s mind. One of the ship owner 
states that a vessel put on hold due to an 
investigation is hard to trade. None of the 
interviewed respondents directly gave up 
customer relationship as a reason to retain 
reports. However lost income due to 
missing contracts or losing ISO-certificates 
makes it reasonable to believe that 
protection of reputation may be a reason 
to withhold mandatory reports.  
The answers given form the ship owners 
also indicate that they look upon obligatory 
reporting as a “paper-pushing exercise”, 
giving little results. It is of the author‟s 
opinion that The Norwegian flag state 
should try to comply with ship owners‟ 
desire of more relevant feedback. This will 
most likely motivate to a higher level of 
reporting and assist in hazard 
identification. As mentioned in a previous 
study (Hassel and Hole, 2009), 
membership to the new European Marine 
Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP) will 
help sharing information between flag 
states and making and distributing safety 
memorandums.  
A voluntary confidential reporting scheme 
like CHIRP appears also to be beneficial. 
The reports submitted are often useful 
because the scheme encourage the 
reporter to give causal factors that 
presumably otherwise would not be 
brought to the surface. If the system, in 
addition, follow up and seek solution to 
every reported event, the motivation for 
reporting may grow even higher. 
Implementing of confidential reporting in 
the aviation industry has been very 
successful in the past. In 2001 Denmark‟s 
air traffic services experienced a rise from 
approximately 15 safety related reports to 
over 900 reports per year after confidential 
reporting was introduced (Flight Safety 
Digest, 2005).   
A contrary approach to improve accident 
reporting routines is to seek information 
from the actors who are more likely to be 
informed about accidents (Hassel and 
Hole, 2009). As stated in ship owner 
interviews, insurance companies are often 
the first to be informed if an accident 
occurs.  Today neither NMD nor any other 
flag state has insight to the insurance 
companies‟ databases (Bakkevig, 2009).   
If access was gained to this database it 
would be easier for the flag state to check 
whether an accident is properly reported 
or not. This proposal would eventually 
require an amendment to the regulation in 
order to gain access.  If introduced, the 
amendment must be fair and not 
disadvantageous to competition, meaning 
it must be affected the same way globally.  
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Figure  4 Components of Safety Culture (Reason, 1997) 
5.3 Culture  
Culture (or bad culture) is the third, and 
perhaps the most important aspect to why 
the reporting procedures are not followed. 
Reason (1997) defines safety culture as a 
culture consisting of several other cultures 
(figure 4). One of the vital components is 
the reporting culture, defined as a culture 
where people encouraged reporting their 
self-induced incidents. In order to function 
intentionally, the reporting culture must be 
accommodated by a learning culture. The 
learning culture is an open minded culture 
willing to take in findings provided through 
different sources of information.  
Findings from the ship owner interviews 
also indicated broken links between 
vessels and the ship owner. Employees 
seem to be afraid of being fired or 
punished and therefore avoid reporting 
accidents or incidents. Still, it is probably 
not right to just blame the seafarers for the 
restraint to report events. The fact that 
there is practically no personally bound 
between the lower ranked crew and the 
onshore organization makes it hard to 
implement faithful connections, meaning 
that the foundation pillars, in some cases, 
are too weak to actually claim a safety 
culture.   
A general low overall reporting 
performance also points out that ship 
owners have a poor learning culture whilst 
the flag states have an equivalent poor 
informed culture. A top view of the 
reporting performance indicates that the 
imbalance between accidents and 
reported events may be rooted in bad 
follow-ups and low penalties for not report. 
Again it is tempting to look at the 
similarities in the aviation industry and see 
how they deal with the issue. “A just 
culture” is a phrase introduced to the 
aviation industry, being a culture that 
balances thrust, which encourage 
reporting, but also set strict and fair 
consequences for unacceptable behavior 
(SKYbrary, 2010).  
When aviation first started, the safety 
management system (SMS) was little 
regulating, allowing a reactive “fly-fix-fly” 
scheme. This regime was allowed to 
continue until the mid 1970s when a new 
practice was introduced trying to   mitigate 
and contain human error through training, 
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and stricter regulations. Learning was 
provided through investigation of incidents 
and from experiences from other 
industries. In the mid 1990s the system 
developed even further by routinely 
analyzing safety related data in a proactive 
perspective (SKYbrary, 2010). During the 
period from the 1960s to the mid 1970s 
there has been a remarkable drop in 
aircraft accidents (Boeing, 2009), meaning 
safety performance can be changed. Of 
course this shift was not ensured by 
change of culture alone, but the constant 
eager chase for improvement would not be 
possible without a driving safety oriented 
culture.  
The marine industry is a more deep-rooted 
industry which traditionally has been 
allowed to operate free and with little 
interference from the consumers. Flags of 
convince have allowed ship owners to 
escape rules setting boundary conditions 
to both economy and safety aspects.  The 
maritime industry has showed a relatively 
poorer willingness to change and to take in 
new standards if not implemented on a 
globally basis (through IMO).  A code for 
International Safety Management (ISM) 
has already been implemented by IMO to 
ensure that ship owners have a safety 
management system. However, the ISM 
code is fairly vague about how the SMS 
should be conducted (Kristiansen, 2005). 
The author believes that more precise 
guidelines may assist ship owners to take 
essential measures and develop their 
culture, which consequently also may 
improve the reporting performance. Follow 
up and guidance could essentially be 
assured by classification societies.    
Of all the interviewed ship owners, best 
impression of reporting procedures was 
given by the company in the offshore 
supply segment. This company seemed to 
have implemented reporting procedures 
way above the standards to the other 
companies. The motive for the strict 
procedures was given to be a mixture of 
self-regulation and customers‟ demand for 
a certain level of safety.  
Interference from consumers is apparently 
an important driving force to catalyze 
improvements to safety in the aviation 
industry.  The aviation industry is closely 
related to its customers as the main 
purpose of flight operations is to transport 
passengers. Besides, the consequences 
of an airplane accident are more likely to 
be fatal compared to a marine accident.  
However, the environmentally aspects of a 
marine accident is more likely to be more 
severe, meaning that a marine accident 
can broadly harm the existence of life to a 
wide range of individuals. A shift in today‟s 
marine safety culture is needed to 
guarantee a better reporting performance, 
which in turns will help gaining a proper 
situational awareness and implementation 
of adequate measures. The driving force 
will probably not be found among the 
maritime industry‟s consumers, thus the 
shift in culture is more likely to be rooted in 
a regulative guidance.    
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has identified some of the 
deficiencies in the maritime reporting 
procedures. Different proposals have been 
pointed out to help gaining a better 
reporting performance and to avoid broken 
links. Much can be learned by looking to 
other industries and other flag states.  
Eventually, changes in legislation, 
motivation and culture are worth next to 
nothing without a system to intercept and 
manage submitted reports. Norway has a 
traditionally been a front-line participator 
promoting safety and high quality 
attitudes. The Norwegian flag state should 
continue its work and, with all its weight, 
develop a fair and effective framework for 
meaningful safety reporting.  
Preferably, further study should be 
assigned to receiving more information 
form ship owners, especially to foreign 
ship owners‟ reporting procedures to the 
Norwegian flag state. The ship owners 
interviewed in this study were all 
Norwegian, resulting in somewhat partial 
results. The interviewed ship owners 
showed little knowledge to foreign flag 
state‟s routines and it seems likely to 
believe that the situation is the same, the 
other way around.   
Further, an assessment of required 
strategically measures should be 
evaluated in the light of the maritime 
industry‟s ability to change. This means 
whether the measures should be 
implemented by increasing the motivation 
to report, by force or in a combination of 
the two.  
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Appendix 1 Examples of Aviation Threshold Grouping 
Group Example Feedback 
Group A Pilot doubtful to own decisions during made during landing 
sequence. 
 
1st Officer reports in his unclear communications with Captain. 
89 
 
 
91 
Group B Cabin crew reporting Captain‟s poor crew resource management. 
 
Cabin crew report Captain forcing crew to over load/ faulty stowage 
of aircraft. 
 
Cabin crew report lack of communication with flight crew. 
 
89 
 
92 
 
 
93 
Group C ATC reports in aerodrome authorities faulty in sorting out a problem 
with a shooting ground adjacent to a regional airport. 
 
Pilots reports in on their company‟s inappropriate re-fueling 
procedures. 
 
Pilots and engineers report in on their company‟s deficient level of 
crewing.  
 
88 
 
 
Repeating 
 
Repeating 
Group D Pilot reports in unclear instructions given by ATC.  
 
Pilot reports in inappropriate weather forecasting by airport 
authorities.  
 
Pilot submits report on faulty on de-icing crew services.  
 
88 
 
91 
 
93 
Group E Pilot submits report on another aircraft taking off without de-icing. 
 
Pilot submits report on another aircrafts wrong use of transponder.  
88 
 
92 
Group F Quality Auditor reports in equipment not compatible with other 
components.  
 
Pilot reports in vague mayday/pan-pan procedures with no clear 
description in regulations. 
 
Pilot reports in his concern on various use of phraseology when 
assigning flight levels.   
88 
 
 
88 
 
 
96 
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Appendix 2 Examples of Marine Threshold Grouping 
Group Example Feedback 
Group A No marine Group A reports in threshold analysis.  
 
 
Group B Engineer report in his supervisors (Chief Engineer and 2nd 
Engineer) inappropriate planning of hot work, resulting in reporter 
being burned. 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Group C Engineer reports in on his Ship Owners inadequate machinery 
monitoring equipment. 
 
A superintendant report in deficiency in anchoring procedures and 
maintenance, resulting in an injured crew member. 
 
16 
 
 
21 
Group D VTS reporting poor/dangerous performance of navigation. 
 
Dredger crewmember reports in too close quarters leading to 
danger of collision. 
Repeating 
 
21 
 
Group E Violation of COLREGs. Masters report in on other vessels not 
following international regulation. 
 
Dangerous encounter between leisure yachting and commercial 
shipping. 
 
Repeating 
 
 
Repeating 
Group F Manager reports in deficiencies with fire distinguisher equipment. 
 
Crewmember reports in vague description of responsibility between 
a Master and Offshore Installation Manager when vessels are 
involved in installation operations. 
 
A marine Pilot reports in a concern about un-standardized radar 
equipment may result loss of control. 
15 
 
15 
 
 
 
16 
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Appendix 3 Ship Owners Interview Form  
Ship owner __________ Flags of registry _________  Type of vessel__________ 
     
 
Reporting routines from vessel to onshore organization: 
1. Does the ship owner have preset routines for reporting accidents or incidents „ship to 
shore‟? 
2. Who is responsible sender? 
3. Who is responsible recipient? 
4. Are there any changes to the routines with respect to where the vessel is at the time?  
5. Do the ship owner have any limits for how quick an accident/incident must be 
submitted  
Reporting from ship owner to flag state: 
1. Does the ship owner have preset routines for reporting accidents and incidents to a 
flag state? 
2. Who is responsible sender (onboard/onshore organization)? 
3. Is the ship owner known with regulations for mandatory reporting in all countries 
where operation takes place? 
4. How does the ship owner follow up proceedings with flag states? 
Ship owner’s consideration of near-misses:  
1. What are the ship owner‟s procedures for reporting of near-misses? 
2. Are near misses reported in the same way as accidents? 
3. In what extent are the crew requested to report near-misses? 
4. May everybody in the crew report a near miss incident? 
Use of reported events for risk analysis: 
1. How is collected data used in risk assessment?  
2. What feedback does the crew receive from the onshore organization‟s risk 
assessment? 
3.  Does the ship owner utilize input from other sources like the Sea-Web™ database 
etc.?   
 Safety Related Information: 
1. Does the ship owner receive any safety related information from its flag state(s)? 
2. How is this information transferred to the crew? 
3. In what extent do you feel that your accident/incident reports contribute a 
constructive development in rules and regulations and increased safety for the 
maritime industry?  
4. Is it any type of information you think should be provided to your company in a larger 
scale than today?   
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Appendix 4 AIBN- Inspection of Accidents obligated to investigation 
 
Date of Occurrence Vessel Name Accident 
Description 
Report made available 
June10th 2008 Bjørnar Working Accident N/A 
August 16th 2008 Lyse Ekspress Grounding February 2009 
August 18th 2008 Star Java Working Accident / 
Fatality 
January 2009 
October 7th 2008 Nord Star  Working Accident April 2009 
October 24th 2008 Nysand Working Accident / 
Fatality 
N/A 
November 20th 2008 Nordic Sky Grounding June 2010 
December 16th 2008 Star Ismene Working Accident N/A 
January 6th  2009 Richard With Grounding March 2010 
January 6th  2009 Øyfart Loss of Vessel May 2010 
January 6th 2009 Nesbuen Working Accident / 
Fatality 
February 2010 
March 2nd 2009 Marina Loss of 
Vessel/Fatality 
May 2010 
March 12th 2009 Lill-Anne Loss of 
Vessel/Fatality 
Feb 2010 Preliminary 
April 9th 2009 Sinni Working 
Accident/Fatality 
Investigation closed due 
to limited resources 
June 4th 2009 Lom Working 
Accident/Fatality 
Investigation closed due 
to limited resources 
July 31st 2009 Langeland Loss of 
Vessel/Fatality 
N/A 
July 31st 2009 Full City Grounding March 2009 Preliminary 
August 19th 2009 Neptun Working Accident N/A 
September 9th 2009 Monica IV Capsize/Missing crew April 2009 
September 16th 2009 Helgeland Grounding N/A 
September 25th 2009 Fredrik Andre Man Over Board/ 
Fatality 
N/A 
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Appendix 5 Aviation Threshold Results 
Air Transport  
Feedback no. Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
 
 
Self-induced 
incident 
Colleague's 
conduct 
Own 
organization 
Co-operative 
organization 
Corresponding external 
employment/organization 
Procedures & 
Equipment 
Sum 
reports 
Issue NO 88 0 0 8 1 1 3 13 
Issue NO 89 1 1 4 1 0 1 8 
Issue NO 90 0 1 3 0 0 3 7 
Issue NO 91 1 0 6 3 0 2 12 
Issue NO 92 0 1 7 3 2 1 14 
Issue NO 93 0 2 5 5 0 1 13 
Total 2 5 33 13 3 11 67 
Percentage 3,0 % 7,5 % 49,3 % 19,4 % 4,5 % 16,4 % 
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Appendix 6 Maritime Industry Threshold Results 
Maritime Industry 
Feedback 
no. Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
 
 
Self-induced 
incident 
Colleague's 
conduct 
Own 
organization 
Co-operative 
organization 
Corresponding external 
employment/organization 
Procedures & 
Equipment 
Sum 
reports 
Issue NO 12 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 
Issue NO 13 0 0 1 0 4 0 5 
Issue NO 14 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 
Issue NO 15 0 0 2 0 2 4 8 
Issue NO 16 0 0 1 0 6 1 8 
Issue NO 17 0 0 1 0 4 0 5 
Issue NO 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Issue NO 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Issue NO 20 0 0 0 1 4 0 5 
Issue NO 21 0 0 1 1 4 0 6 
Issue NO 22 0 0 1 2 1 1 5 
Issue NO 23 0 0 1 0 3 0 4 
Issue NO 24 0 0 3 0 3 0 6 
Issue NO 25 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 
Issue NO 26 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
Total 0 1 13 6 38 8 66 
Percentage 0,0 % 1,5 % 19,7 % 9,1 % 57,6 % 12,1 % 
  
